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Triage of Scarce Critical Care Resources in COVID-19 An Implementation Guide for **Regional Allocation**

66 An Expert Panel Report of the Task Force for Mass Critical Care and the 67 American College of Chest Physicians 68 69

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> 77 KEY WORDS: COVID-19 pandemic; disaster preparedness; scarcity of resources; surge capacity; triage 78

Perspective

The current pandemic of the novel 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19) because of SARS-CoV-2 has led to a substantial increase in the demands on acute and critical care services in hospitals around the world. Even modest numbers of critically ill patients with COVID-19 are rapidly exceeding existing hospital capacity. Although a minor or moderate surge can be accommodated by using conventional and contingency surge strategies such as conserving, substituting, adapting, and reusing existing resources, current experiences from other countries managing COVID-19 suggest that the

magnitude of the surge will substantially 82 exceed capacity, necessitating a crisis surge 83 response.¹⁻⁴ The clinical demands will exceed 84 the ability to provide one or more crucial 85 86 resources essential to deliver basic critical 87 care, therefore necessitating decisions 88 regarding the reallocation of resources. This 89 potential requires preparation of a triage 90 system to best allocate available critical care 91 resources to meet severe surge to maximize 92 benefit for the greatest number of people.^{4,5} 93 Importantly, this triage system should only 94 be deployed as a last resort and implemented 95 as resources become limited and after all 96

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44 ABBREVIATIONS: COVID-19 = novel 2019 coronavirus disease; HCW = health-care worker; PPE = personal protective equipment; 45 SOFA = Sequential Organ Failure Assessment 46 AFFILIATIONS: From the Naval Medical Center (Drs Maves, Seda, and Q4 47 Parrish), San Diego, CA; the University of Ottawa (Dr Downar), Ottawa, ON, Canada; the University of Minnesota (Dr Dichter), 48 Minneapolis, MN; the Hennepin County Medical Center (Dr Hick), 49 Minneapolis, MN; the Sharp Coronado Hospital (Dr Devereaux), 50 Coronado, CA; the Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth College (Dr Geiling), Hanover, NH; the University of British Columbia (Dr 51 Kissoon), Vancouver, BC, Canada; the Weill Cornell Medical College

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attempts to surge, move patients, or shift resources from
 regions with greater availability have been made.

When implemented, triage must be applied to all current 114 and new patients presenting with critical illness, 115 regardless of the diagnosis of COVID-19 or another 116 117 illness, while maintaining underlying ethical principles 118 of social justice, beneficence, nonmaleficence, respect for 119 people and their dignity, veracity and the need to uphold 120 trust within society, and fidelity to one another within 121 health systems. We must uphold our duty to care for all 122 patients, even those unable to receive critical care 123 interventions. To enact this triage plan, a triage decision 124 support protocol, infrastructure, processes, legal and 125 regulatory protections, and training⁵ are required, all of 126 which are currently lacking in most institutions and 127 regions. 128

129 Additionally, there is a need to ensure that patients who 130 do not initially receive critical care resources are still 131 provided the best supportive care possible and are 132 reevaluated, at minimum daily, for consideration of 133 resource allocation as supplies become available. This 134 will result in a sliding scale from crisis to contingency, 135 136 and flexibility should be anticipated. The absence of a 137 triage system, consistently applied within and between 138 hospitals, may lead to unnecessary deaths, increased 139 moral distress for frontline physicians, and a lack of public 140 confidence in the fairness of scarce resource allocation. It 141 is important to recognize that the initiation of adult 142 triage levels does not itself imply initiation of pediatric 143 triage (or vice versa). However, dependent on the level of 144 impact within the pediatric system, pediatric hospitals 145 will need to consider lower-level triage initiation at a point 146 when adult systems have reached crisis triage, to respect 147 the principles of utility and fairness population-wide. 148

With appropriate critical care surge planning, we hope
that the use of a triage plan that limits the delivery of
critical care should be rare, but the potential
consequences of failing to prepare for this eventuality
are serious.

Table 1 provides operational steps to implement a triage
system within a state, county, or jurisdiction and
highlights respective stakeholder responsibilities.

- 159
- 160 Justification/Rationale
- 161 162 Surge Planning

163 COVID-19 is caused by a novel coronavirus that can
164 cause severe acute respiratory illness. Early experience
165 with the virus in China and Italy suggests that the virus

166 has a community symptomatic attack rate of COVID-19 167 of up to 30% (with approximately double that number of 168 SARS-CoV-2 infections because up to one-half of cases 169 appear to be asymptomatic or paucisymptomatic). Of 170 these, as many as 5% to 25% may require hospital 171 admission, 5% to 8% may require ICU admission, and 172 2% to 4% may require mechanical ventilation for acute 173 respiratory failure. For example, in the greater New York 174 City metropolitan area alone (with a population of 8.4 175 million people), a community attack rate of 35% (ie, a 176 symptomatic attack rate of 17.5%), leading to 1.3 million 177 178 people with varying levels of disease from now until 179 midsummer, could generate approximately 88,000 total 180 hospitalizations and 13,000 ICU admissions under a 181 scenario in which 7% of all affected people require 182 hospitalization and 14% of those require critical care 183 beds. Under a more severe scenario (20% hospitalized 184 and 24% to ICU, rates now seen during the week of 185 March 23, 2020, at New York City hospitals), this could 186 lead to up to 190,000 hospitalizations and 58,000 ICU 187 admissions over the course of the pandemic, with a peak 188 concurrent ICU census of approximately 22,000 before 189 summer. At baseline, the United States has approximately 190 68,000 adult and 5,000 PICU beds, a per capita ICU bed 191 availability that exceeds most other countries.⁶ Clearly, 192 193 either scenario is likely to vastly overwhelm any current 194 health system, as is occurring in Italy and elsewhere. 195

Triage is the course of action that we take when we have exhausted our ability to expand our critical care resources, that is, to surge. Surge capacity refers to the ability of a hospital or other health-care system to expand its normal operating capacity in the setting of an emergency. Surge capacity includes the key features of staff, space, supplies, and systems with communications as a critical fifth feature. All five of these elements are necessary to permit hospitals to surge effectively in disasters. The Task Force for Mass Critical Care³ provided a classification system for differing levels of surge response in their 2014 guidelines on the management of the critically ill during disasters and pandemics.

210 Conventional Capacity: A hospital should be able to 211 increase its critical care capacity by approximately 212 20% above its normal limitations. This level would be 213 implemented in major mass casualty incidents that 214 trigger activation of the hospital emergency operations 215 plan. Most facilities should be able to achieve this level 216 of response using existing staffing and resources, 217 218 including strategies such as cancellation of elective 219 procedures and transferring of appropriate patients out 220 of ICUs.

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TABLE 1] Operational Steps to Implement a Triage System

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Specific Actions Suggested	Stakeholders Responsible
 Inventory of potential ICU resources for a surge in demand Physical ventilators and beds (eg, OR, PACU) Human resources (staff with ICU training) Supplies and space to deliver care (eg, medications, disposable items, PPE, PACU) 	Individual health-care facilities
 Establish identification triggers for and initiation of triage: as clinical demand reaches crisis stage and that crisis standards of care, including triage, should be initiated The decision to initiate triage should be made by an identified regional authority with situational awareness of regional health-care demands Triage must be consistently applied across the region, with documented rationale and oversight by the relevant regional authority 	Regional government health authorities (county/state/ province/national) Regional or national emergency management authorities (eg, CDC or equivalent, state/province public health department)
 Preparation of a triage system Create central triage committee for the region, tasked with coordination and standardization. This should include representation of key stakeholders (medical, nursing, ethics, law, patient and community representatives) Identify members of institutional tertiary triage teams and support structures Prepare and distribute training materials to local officials for standardization of implementation 	
 Agreement on a triage protocol to target resources to those with the greatest incremental benefit 	Regional health authorities and coalitions Critical care professional societies and community, along with multistakeholder input
 5. Consideration of changes to allow limits to the delivery of life-sustaining measures in times of crisis care, and indemnity against litigation for decisions made in accordance with the triage policy a. Options include a modification or waivers of existing requirements through legislative means, an order through the Public Health Act, or through emer- gency powers 	 Regional health authority (ie, state health commissioner, provincial health minister) Regional justice authority (ie, attorney general, governor)
 6. Standards of care a. Modify end-of-life care policies to indicate that the standard of care in a pandemic is to triage patients according to an accepted plan, and that consent is not required to implement treatment decisions taken according to that plan b. Ensure that patients unable to receive invasive life-sustaining therapies (eg, mechanical ventilation) are provided the best available care under the circumstances (eg, supplemental oxygen through another route, palliative care, family support) c. Clear clinical guidelines for medical management of people with respiratory failure, including palliative measures d. Standardized communication tools (eg, sensitive information sheets) to inform members of the public about triage decisions and the rationale behind them 	community
 7. Family and societal support a. Transparency with the public about triage processes b. Communication plans with the public (telephone hotlines, online resources) to ensure that information is readily available c. Work to preserve the integrity of family units, especially in cases of young children and during end-of-life d. Ensure support for grieving families 	Institutional social work, mental health, and palliative care services Consideration of COVID-19 hospice services
 8. Health-care worker support a. A systematic communication plan with the reasons for triage system activation, training on its use, and companion decision support tools to ensure consistent implementation is essential b. Triage decisions must be made collaboratively, using a team-based approach that includes the designated triage officer, providers directly assigned to care for individual patients, with support from hospital ethics and palliative care experts when necessary c. A systematic approach to support health-care workers, including incident debriefing, resiliency skills, and services to provide emotional support must be implemented in advance of triage system activation 	

(Continued)

331 TABLE 1] (Continued)

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333 9. Pediatric considerations Local health-care coalitions 334 a. Concentrate care for children at pediatric centers to preserve necessary pe- diatric systems, including accepting any pediatric transfers, even ones for Local health-care coalitions 336 whom they may not typically care Local health-care coalitions 337 b. Increasing pediatric age thresholds to 21, 25, or 30 years iteratively as surge surge 338 requires (as long as no adult comorbidities exist that are not consistent with pediatric critical care practice)			
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a. concentrate pediatric care in pediatri	334 335 336 337 338 339	 a. Concentrate care for children at pediatric centers to preserve necessary pediatric systems, including accepting any pediatric transfers, even ones for whom they may not typically care b. Increasing pediatric age thresholds to 21, 25, or 30 years iteratively as surge requires (as long as no adult comorbidities exist that are not consistent with pediatric critical care practice) 	Local health-care coalitions

341 CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; COVID-19 = novel 2019 coronavirus disease; OR = operating room; PPE = personal protective 342 equipment.

Contingency Capacity: This level would be used during 344 a disaster whose medical demands significantly exceeded 345 routine hospital and community resources. At this level, 346 347 a hospital will expand its critical care capacity by up to 348 100%, in part through modification of existing spaces 349 and expanding the use of certain staff members. For 350 example, critical care services may be provided in a 351 postanesthesia care unit, stepdown unit, or other high-352 dependency area with cross-training of staff under the 353 direction of critical care team members. Ventilators 354 intended for the operating room, noninvasive 355 ventilation, or transport can be repurposed to augment 356 the overall ventilator supply. At this level of surge 357 response, it can be expected that medical care will be at 358 or near the predisaster prevailing community standard. 359

360 Crisis Capacity: This level would be implemented in 361 catastrophic situations, such as suggested by the current 362 COVID-19 modeling, that result in a significant impact 363 on the standard of medical care that can be provided. 364 Severe limitations of space, staff, and supplies would not 365 allow hospitals to provide the usual standard of medical 366 care. At this level, hospitals and communities will need 367 368 to consider triage principles. 369

The numbers provided are a construct, not absolute 370 rules. As the balance of resources vs demand shifts over 371 372 time during an emergency, the degree of the surge 373 response and any necessary triage will shift as well 374 (Fig 1). Shortages of trained staff, ventilators, or personal 375 protective equipment (PPE) are very real threats in the 376 current pandemic and will likely be triggers for shifting 377 to triage and crisis standards of care if they should occur. 378 As such, we need to have an accurate inventory of those 379 resources, understanding that the limitations would 380 likely be staff rather than ventilators or space; however, 381 the ongoing experiences in New York suggest that all 382 three may easily be in short supply. However, the early 383 experience in Italy, which has roughly the same number 384 of ICU beds and ventilators per capita as many other 385

developed countries, indicates that our current critical care resources are insufficient to manage a similar outbreak.

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
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A Triage Plan Is Necessary to Ensure the Greatest Benefit to the Greatest Number, and to Reduce the Number of Patients Who Will Be Unable to Receive Critical Care Resources

A number of pandemic triage plans have already been proposed for viral respiratory illness and are outlined in a recent overview on triage.⁷ When the demand for critical care overwhelms the resources available, a resource allocation plan is essential to deliver both the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people, and to maintain the function of the health-care system and prevent random or otherwise inequitable distribution of scarce resources.

Triage require us to accept that some individuals will not receive critical care resources which might have been dedicated to their care under normal circumstances, whereas some individuals will have critical care interventions withdrawn if they fail to improve. Although as yet untested in practice, modeling studies evaluating predicted mortality in pandemics have demonstrated that more people will die because of lack of critical care resources than would have died if triage systems were implemented.^{8,9} Without a triage plan, patients will receive critical care resources by random chance or a first-come, first-serve basis, likely leading to overall worse outcomes across a population and more individuals being denied critical care.

A triage system requires an ethical basis, which we
summarize in Figure 2.10 Limiting and withdrawing
critical care resources are justified by the utilitarian
principle of providing the greatest good to the greatest
number of people. Although the general principle of
saving the most lives possible holds true in any system,
the decisions of identifying which patients to prioritize433
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differences in baseline mortality risk because ofunderlying health.

553 Communities may choose to prioritize to key groups, to 554 include health-care workers (HCWs), first responders, 555 research volunteers, or others who are either perceived 556 557 as risking their own safety for the public's benefit or who 558 have a special role in pandemic response; however, strict 559 definitions of who is included in these key groups and 560 the social utility of such preferences remain unresolved. 561 Children and pregnant women may receive special 562 priority in other schema, with the concept of saving not 563 only the most lives but also the greatest number of years 564 of life.^{11,12} All of these must be taken in consideration, 565 and different cultural priorities will vary between (and 566 within) different countries. This paper is inadequate to 567 answer these questions for a given community; sample 568 triage protocols are available on the CHEST website for 569 570 review and guidance. 571

These decisions to implement a triage system should be 572 573 driven by the inability of regional health systems to 574 deliver care to all critically ill patients because of an 575 overwhelming surge in demand that reaches crisis levels. 576 The triage protocol we are referring to in this case is for 577 tertiary triage, which takes place at an acute care hospital 578 when deciding whether or not to admit for critical care 579 services.⁵ In a broad sense, patients who present for 580 tertiary triage are going to fit into one of three categories: 581 (1) too well to benefit from critical care, (2) too sick to 582 benefit from critical care because of severe underlying 583 illness or a poor likelihood of surviving their 584 hospitalization, or (3) sick enough to benefit from 585 586 critical care. The goal of triage protocols is not to 587 exclude categories of patients based on age or underlying 588 disease, and protocols that explicitly exclude patients 589 based on a single criterion alone may run afoul of 590 antidiscrimination laws in many jurisdictions. Rather, 591 the goal of a triage protocol is to maximize the use of 592 critical care resources for patients in the third category. 593 These categories apply to all patients presenting with 594 critical illness under crisis standards of care, not just 595 those infected with SARS-CoV-2.13 Although we must 596 recognize that patients less likely to benefit from critical 597 598 care may not be provided those services and 599 interventions under a triage system, reallocation may 600 occur as resources and demand change.

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The best available epidemiologic data, combined with
expert input, will be required to create triage protocols
that reflect COVID-19-specific mortality and resource
utilization predictions. Although the use of acute illness

606 scores, such as the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment 607 (SOFA) score, were proposed for previous pandemic 608 triage plans, a growing body of evidence suggests such 609 scoring systems are unlikely to predict critical care 610 outcomes with sufficient accuracy,^{14,15} in particular 611 patients suffering from COVID-19,¹⁶⁻¹⁹ or be a useful 612 basis for triage decisions based on the current protocol 613 cut points.^{13,20,21} 614

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The prognostic accuracy of SOFA varies across its range of scores, with greater variability and less accuracy at lower scores than at higher scores, and is not immediately applicable to all disease states: a patient with sepsis may have a SOFA score of 4 and a low mortality risk, for example, whereas a patient with an intracranial hemorrhage and a Glasgow Coma Scale score of 3 could share this SOFA score of 4 but have a very high risk of death. Potentially subjective elements, such as the dose of vasopressor administered or the assessment of Glasgow Coma Scale during sedation breaks, are subject to physician judgment and are affected by drugs and other interventions.²² Because outcomes at differing SOFA scores vary across studies and are generally absent in the context of crisis standards of care, system-level data are necessary to guide selection of threshold values.

All of these factors combine to raise a number of logistical and ethical concerns regarding the use of the SOFA score in a triage algorithm. Therefore, we propose triage protocols that are not solely dependent on SOFA (or another single scoring tool) because SOFA is unlikely to be adequate in and of itself for triage decisions. It is important to mention that any scoring system at this stage of the pandemic will need to be pragmatic and combine other predictors of ICU mortality, such as disease-specific indicators for non-COVID-19 conditions, frailty scores, comorbidity indices, and physician judgment as best possible. This will need to be balanced against the need for a triage scoring tool that is actionable: complex enough to provide prognostic information with acceptable accuracy, but simple enough to be implemented in a timely manner.

As our knowledge of COVID-19 increases, it is likely that better prognostic scoring tools will be developed; when this occurs, triage systems should incorporate these into their protocols to improve our prediction of critical care outcomes and mitigate the limitations of physiological indices in isolation.

Periodic reassessment of patients is a necessary part of any triage algorithm, to assess for clinical improvement,

661 deterioration, or any other changes that affect prognosis. 662 COVID-19 illness seems to last longer than influenza, 663 suggesting that reassessments at 48 and 120 h noted in 664 earlier triage protocols^{5,13} are too short to provide an 665 adequate trial of therapy in patients with COVID-19. 666 Therefore, any triage protocol will need to be reassessed 667 and modified as clinical experience with SARS-CoV-2 668 infection grows. 669

Effective and Ethical Triage Requires Infrastructure, Oversight, Processes, and Training

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674 Triage criteria are one component of a three-part system
675 designed to integrate clinical decisions with incident
676 commanders at the facility and jurisdictional level. They
677 include the following:

- Concept of operations: what is the process that is followed at the facility when making resource allocation decisions?
- Criteria: what is the protocol that is used, and how is that reviewed and updated as new information becomes available?
- Coordination: how are the efforts of the facility
 integrated with other hospitals in the area to assure
 information sharing, consistent policies, and patient and resource movement to diffuse impact as
 needed to assure a consistent standard of care in
 the region?

691 Concept of Operations: Concept of operations
692 Concept of Operations: Concept of operations
693 describes a proactive approach to triage which should be
694 invoked whenever a prolonged incident occurs. This
695 strategy is preferable to reactive bedside decisions based
696 on physician discretion that may occur early in an event.
697 It involves the following several key elements:
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- Assuring that resource allocation decisions are integrated into the hospital incident command system, and that the process and protocols are understood and accepted by leadership. The incident command cycle for crisis events is illustrated in Figure 3.
- A multidisciplinary clinical care committee associated with incident command that makes medical practice recommendations to address increased demand and provides oversight of any triage decisions. This group has broad clinical representation and includes ethics and legal input.
- A described process for multidisciplinary decisionmaking—ideally involving more than one physician with expertise in the area, expectations of the decision process, communication, appeals (where possible), and review (Fig 4).

The decision process is designed to be rapid, but still will716likely take up to 1 h. This may have to be abbreviated717during times of overwhelming demand, and this718expectation should be spelled out. Those providers719forced into real-time decision-making should use the720same protocol and criteria, and the situation should be721documented by incident command.723

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Triage Protocol

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The actual clinical criteria on which the decisions are 727 based should be approved by the clinical care committee 728 and updated as additional information about the specific 729 epidemiologic and outcome characteristics of the disease 730 are understood. Other resources will likely be in short 731 supply and will require guidance from the clinical care 732 733 committee. A reference card set is available that 734 describes general approaches to a range of resources 735 (https://www.health.state.mn.us/communities/ep/surge/ 736 crisis/standards.pdf). A simplified version of a triage 737 protocol is provided in Figure 5 for reference. 738

739 Coordination: Triage criteria and processes should be as 740 consistent as possible within a region. Strong, 741 collaborative regional efforts are a cornerstone of 742 effective response and must be implemented regardless 743 of any competitive posture between health-care systems 744 that may exist during usual operations. Hospitals must 745 share information, adjust protocols, and balance 746 resources and patient loads across the immediate 747 surrounding region to ensure as consistent a standard of 748 749 care as is possible. The regional structures should 750 involve sharing information about available beds, 751 ventilators, advanced care resources such as ECMO (a 011 752 regional approach to ECMO allocation is found in the 753 card set previously referenced), and staff, and a critical 754 care working group to establish joint triage protocols 755 and coordinate mass critical care planning, and 756 potentially involve a central gatekeeping mechanism for 757 regional referrals and critical care triage. A central triage 758 committee should be appointed, with connections to 759 local triage officers and teams at each hospital. A 760 761 standardized documentation process (paper or 762 electronic) should be used to allow efficient data 763 collection and decision-making. The protocol should be 764 made available to all triage personnel in advance to allow 765 familiarization and feedback. A mechanism to revisit 766 triage decisions that vary from conventional care 767 practices should be strongly considered to reassess 768 individual patient progress if clinical demand decreases 769 or if capacity increases. Figure 6 illustrates the structure 770




Figure 3 – Process for crisis care integration with incident command. HCC = health-care coalition.

of a triage system at the regional level and integration 806 with a hospital incident command structure. 807

809 Many Current Legal and Regulatory Frameworks 810 Preclude a Triage System Because of the Need to 811 Withhold or Withdraw Artificial Life Support Without 812 Consent 813

814 Legislation in most states and provinces provides the 815 framework for medical decision-making. Broadly 816 speaking, these laws indicate that plans of treatment 817 require consent of the patient or their surrogate. In some 818 jurisdictions, courts have ruled that physicians do not 819 require consent to withhold CPR (or other life-820 sustaining measures) that they thought to be outside the 821 standard of care.²³ Even within a single country, there 822 may be wide regional variation on the degree to which 823 physicians may make unilateral decisions regarding the 824 provision of resuscitative care.²⁴ 825

A published report from the Institute of Medicine²⁵ outlined some of the important considerations for medical and legal standards of care in a disaster. Key elements of this report include that (1) medical and legal standards of care are not always the same, (2) standards are flexible according to the context of the situation, and (3) authorities need to provide clarity and guidance about standards. Physicians who face uncertainty about how courts and regulatory agencies will assess the standard of care "may react negatively to actual or perceived risks of liability,"25 which would result in worse outcomes for all patients, families, and providers alike whether infected with COVID-19 or not.

875 To implement a triage system, many jurisdictions would 876 need a modification or suspension of their health-care 877 consent acts to the effect that in the situation of 878 pandemic triage, consent would not be required for 879 decisions about the withholding or withdrawal of 880

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
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
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rapidly accessible and able to decide in a timely enough
manner to provide actionable direction to physicians.
All triage decisions should eventually be reviewed to
allow for transparency and accountability.

Standards of Care

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Withholding critical care resources must not mean
neglect, and it should not be considered tantamount to
terminal care or medical assistance during the dying
process. We must care for all patients.

Patients who do not receive critical care because of a 1113 triage system must be supported, and the rationale for 1114 1115 medical decision-making must be clearly communicated 1116 to them or their family members. Shifting the normal 1117 role that patients and their surrogates play in decision-1118 making is a substantial deviation from normal medical 1119 practice, carrying with it a commensurately large 1120 obligation to ensure that these individuals will receive 1121 the best possible care given the crisis response. 1122

1123 Studies of severe acute respiratory illness have suggested 1124 that many patients with respiratory failure can recover 1125 effectively without mechanical assistance, and opioids can 1126 be used to treat dyspnea without increasing mortality.²⁶ A 1127 patient unable to receive invasive mechanical ventilation 1128 may be able to receive supplemental oxygen through a 1129 noninvasive route as resources permit. The 1130 implementation of early palliative care interventions can 1131 provide a better quality of life, less treatment intensity, 1132 and no consistent impact on mortality.^{27,28} This offers a 1133 strong rationale for the careful integration of symptom 1134 1135 management, in alignment with palliative care principles, 1136 for all patients impacted by crisis care.²⁹ 1137

Clear clinical guidelines must be established by 1138 institutions for the care of all patients with respiratory 1139 failure and shock, including those patients unable to 1140 1141 receive critical care therapies. It may be possible, 1142 depending on the capabilities of a given institution, to 1143 provide some forms of critical care monitoring and 1144 therapy in a crisis situation outside of the traditional ICU. 1145 Protocols to support the use of opioids for dyspnea, other 1146 key supportive and palliative interventions, and the 1147 conscientious use of therapies subject to shortages (eg, 1148 bronchodilators, antimicrobial agents, fluid therapy) can 1149 be of service for bedside physicians. Similarly, clear and 1150 standardized communication tools, such as information 1151 sheets, can inform the public about crisis standards of 1152 1153 care, can inform about triage criteria, and may offer the 1154 wider community opportunities for feedback as a means 1155 of increasing public trust.

Family and Societal Support

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1157 An effective triage system must help physicians maintain 1158 transparency in their decision-making. The transition of 1159 health-care systems to crisis care delivery requires a 1160 systematic communication strategy at the community 1161 level to explain the situation and ongoing efforts to 1162 maintain the best possible level of care. Patients and 1163 families have the right to expect that those with similar 1164 1165 critical care needs will be treated fairly and equitably, 1166 with no preference to any particular group. A hotline 1167 and electronic communication platform may help gauge 1168 community response and concerns during the event and 1169 will inform leaders regarding the emotional reassurances 1170 needed by members of the society.³⁰ 1171

Many centers have limited the number of caregivers at 1172 1173 the bedside, reduced family movement in the hospital, 1174 and required the use of PPE for all visitors to the 1175 bedside. This use of PPE by visitors and caregivers will 1176 become increasingly problematic considering worldwide 1177 shortages, with some centers reportedly only permitting 1178 their use by visitors at crucial contact times, such as the 1179 end of life. These limitations in family contact can only 1180 increase the burden of suffering, and new methods will 1181 be needed to reduce this burden, to include the use of 1182 technologic solutions (eg, video conferencing via tablets 1183 and smartphones) to attempt to preserve as much 1184 1185 intrapersonal contact as possible.³¹ 1186

With the use of triage algorithms in crisis care, even the 1187 most transparent systems of decision- making may lead 1188 to prolonged feelings of guilt from lack of personal 1189 preparedness, an inability to assist, or frustration toward 1190 the government and the medical system. Ancillary team ¹¹⁹¹ 1192 members (including palliative care, psychiatrists, 1193 psychologists, other mental health workers, and social 1194 workers) will need to assist with the burden of 1195 communication with ICU families. These professionals 1196 should remain in regular communication with family via 1197 telephone, text message, or other means as best possible. 1198 It is additionally important to anticipate and plan for 1199 supporting these professionals, who themselves will 1200 require support because of secondary moral distress. 1201

HCW Support

1204The term moral injury has been increasingly suggested1205to describe the distress that HCWs can experience from1206the excessive demands of energy, strength, and resources1207often experienced within current health-care systems.1208The resulting constellation of symptoms—fatigue,1209frustration, cynicism, and inefficiency—has historically1210

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been defined as burnout, but this term fails to capture
the similarities that this syndrome may share with
posttraumatic stress disorder or the severity of the
associated psychological injury.³³

Beyond the issues of fatigue and burnout, however, there 1216 1217 are the very real threats of infection and personal harm 1218 because of workplace exposure to COVID-19. Shortages 1219 of PPE in the United States and other countries have 1220 exacerbated this threat; reports of hospitals curtailing 1221 PPE use and sanctioning HCWs for using their own 1222 personal PPE in the presence of shortages have only 1223 made these issues more acute. 1224

1225 The principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence are 1226 core to the practices of medicine and nursing, and the 1227 impact of asking physicians to shift their perspective 1228 during a crisis surge response should not be 1229 underestimated.⁶ Feelings of social isolation are 1230 common in times of crisis and are further exacerbated 1231 by current recommendations for social distancing, 1232 infection control practices, and prolonged use of PPE. 1233 Disruptions in normal routines, concern for personal 1234 welfare, and fear for the safety of loved ones all add 1235 1236 additional stress. A significant number of physicians in 1237 active practice already exhibit signs and symptoms of 1238 moral injury, with higher self-reported rates of poor 1239 patient safety habits, more medical errors in their 1240 practice, and increased rates of suicidal ideation.³⁴ The 1241 personal risk to bedside physicians during the COVID-1242 19 pandemic, especially in light of international 1243 shortages of PPE, only increases this strain on the 1244 workforce. This can be a significant threat to both the 1245 quality and efficiency of care in a crisis. 1246

1247 Providing members of the health-care team with 1248 structured opportunities to debrief after critical events 1249 and ongoing opportunities for engagement and input to 1250 improve the inevitably dynamic work environment have 1251 also been shown to be effective to promote community, 1252 connectedness, and meaning. Incorporating these 1253 1254 principles thoughtfully during triage system activation 1255 requires a systematic leadership communication plan to 1256 explain the reasons for its use; formal training to ensure 1257 consistent implementation; and collaborative, team-1258 based approaches to decision-making led by the 1259 designated triage officers and including physicians 1260 directly caring for patients with the strong support of 1261 hospital ethics and palliative care experts. 1262

Similarly, institutions and governments must prevent
the sanctioning of HCWs for attempting to protect their
own (and their families') safety through nonstandard

PPE usage; instead, health-care organizations need to
redouble efforts to expand PPE availability, be it through
innovative reusage methods, adoption of acceptable
alternative forms of PPE (eg, the use of industrial
respirators), and governmental and industry support for
increased manufacturing.1266
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Existing resilience measures and support programs will 1273 1274 need to be strengthened to protect the psychological 1275 well-being of patients, families, and the HCWs treating 1276 them both during and after these events.⁵ It is wise to 1277 consider a structured schedule of opportunities within 1278 each work unit and the hospital at large to encourage 1279 staff to learn about and use these measures, especially in 1280 the setting of anticipated prolonged periods of modified 1281 work practices that the current COVID-19 pandemic 1282 threatens to create. 1283

1284Institutions may refer to existing resources inimplementing plans, such as the National Academy ofMedicine in the United States (https://nam/edu/clinicianwellbeing) and the Intensive Care Society in theUnited Kingdom (www.ics.ac.uk), which has put a freeWellbeing Resource Library online with specific contentrelevant to COVID-19.

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A personal connection with the patients is perhaps the most important and powerful tool to maintain our sense of purpose and best care for their ongoing needs, and structured opportunities to develop and maintain a human connection with the individuals whose needs we serve will also help to combat feelings of depersonalization in the critical care environment that are only exacerbated by the current crisis.³⁵

Pediatric Considerations

Any triage system must balance the need to save the 1304 most lives possible with the need to save total life-years. 1305 1306 Critically ill children therefore are usually considered 1307 separately from adults when triage considerations are 1308 made. The fundamental precepts of crisis critical care-1309 including care and attention to the health of the entire 1310 family as a unit and respect for the role of parents-1311 remain critical to the success of disaster management. 1312 Institutions must balance the needs of family-centered 1313 care vs the risk of disease transmission. One or more 1314 caregivers usually accompany pediatric patients; these 1315 caregivers are likely to be close contact with a patient 1316 and should be treated as presumably exposed; however, 1317 1318 they may be asymptomatic at the time, and will require 1319 monitoring for symptomatic disease and potential 1320 quarantine.

1321	Incorporating children into a regional triage algorithm is
1322	complicated for a disease process such as COVID-19
1323	that largely affects adults, at least in terms of critical
1324	illness. Much of pediatric critical care is separated into
1325	very few pediatric centers, with only some pediatric
1326	
1327	resources being applicable to adult groups. To prevent
1328	any hospital from needing to use crisis standards of care,
1329	pediatric-only hospitals in an affected region have a duty
1330	to surge to prevent adult and mixed adult/pediatric
1331	hospitals going into crisis as regional capacity needs
1332	require. In such a scenario, pediatric-only hospitals
1333	should consider the steps outlined in Table 1.
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1335	Pediatric care should preferably be concentrated in
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pediatric centers to preserve necessary pediatric systems. 1336 Given the low mortality of most conditions with which 1337 children are admitted to intensive care (< 5%), 1338 1339 patients < 18 years of age who meet the mortality 1340 criteria associated with the adult triage levels will be very 1341 rare, such that the adoption of the same triage system in 1342 pediatrics is unlikely to mobilize further resources. An 1343 entirely different algorithm that is pediatric-specific 1344 would be necessary in considering pediatric-specific 1345 triage policies. Some centers have modeled situations 1346 where a certain mortality rate or predicted ventilator-1347 days could preclude the offering of invasive ventilator 1348 support to some children at a time of significantly 1349 increased short-term ventilator needs,⁸ but there is a 1350 paucity of pediatric-specific data to guide such triage. 1351 Medical specifics aside, the guiding ethical principles 1352 1353 remain the same for pediatric triage and should still be 1354 applied. 1355

Pediatric centers should regionally activate pediatric 1356 triage when shared pediatric resources (accounting for 1357 1358 transportation capacity) are exhausted, with mortality 1359 predictions subject to expert opinion, which should be 1360 agreed on and documented by at least two members of 1361 the treating team. Prior to movement to higher triage 1362 levels, especially considering such steps being unlikely to 1363 mobilize resources, discussions should be held regarding 1364 movement of ventilators to pediatric centers from adult 1365 sites if there is a difference in resource demand. 1366

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Conclusions

This framework can provide the essential tools to rapidly 1370 1371 assist communities to establish the infrastructure 1372 necessary to equitably meet the clinical needs of the 1373 greatest number of patients with COVID-19 during a 1374 time of scarce resources. It is the goal of the Task Force 1375

to	minimize the need for allocation of scarce resources	1376	
as much as possible.		1377	
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	United States Government." Title 17 U.S.C. §101 defines a US ernment work as a work prepared by a military service member or	1389	
	ployee of the US government as part of that person's official duties.	1390	
	e opinions and assertions contained herein are those of the authors	1391	
	do not reflect the official views or position of the Department of Navy, Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs, the	1392	
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