

Journal Pre-proof

Potential Fecal Transmission of SARS-CoV-2: Current Evidence and Implications for Public Health

E. Susan Amirian



PII: S1201-9712(20)30273-3

DOI: <https://doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.ijid.2020.04.057>

Reference: IJID 4145

To appear in: *International Journal of Infectious Diseases*

Received Date: 26 March 2020

Revised Date: 11 April 2020

Accepted Date: 18 April 2020

Please cite this article as: Amirian ES, Potential Fecal Transmission of SARS-CoV-2: Current Evidence and Implications for Public Health, *International Journal of Infectious Diseases* (2020), doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2020.04.057>

This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

© 2020 Published by Elsevier.

1 **Potential Fecal Transmission of SARS-CoV-2: Current Evidence and Implications for**
2 **Public Health**

3 E. Susan Amirian¹

4

5 ¹ Public Health & Healthcare Program, Texas Policy Lab, School of Social Sciences, Rice
6 University, Houston, Texas, USA

7

8 **Corresponding Author:**

9 E. Susan Amirian, PhD, MSPH

10 Public Health & Healthcare Program

11 Texas Policy Lab

12 School of Social Sciences

13 Rice University

14 6100 Main St, Houston, TX 77005

15 ea25@rice.edu

16

17 **Running Title:** SARS-CoV-2 Detection in Fecal Specimens

18

19 **Key Words:** coronavirus; COVID-19; SARS-CoV-2; fecal-oral transmission; mode of
20 transmission; route of transmission; disease control

21

21

22 **Abstract**

23 Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) emerged in Hubei Province, China in December 2019
24 and has since become a global pandemic, with hundreds of thousands of cases and over 165
25 affected countries. Primary routes of transmission of the causative virus, severe acute respiratory
26 syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2), are through respiratory droplets and close person-to-
27 person contact. While information about other potential modes of transmission are relatively
28 sparse, evidence supporting the possibility of a fecally-mediated mode of transmission has been
29 accumulating. Here, current knowledge on the potential for fecal transmission is briefly reviewed
30 and the possible implications are discussed from a public health perspective.

31

32 Introduction

33 The current pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) emerged in Hubei
34 Province, China in December 2019 and has spread rapidly to over 165 countries in
35 approximately 3 months (Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and
36 Engineering, 2020, Shanmugaraj et al., 2020). The primary routes of transmission of the virus,
37 SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2), are through respiratory
38 droplets and close person-to-person contact, but knowledge about other potential modes of
39 transmission (e.g., fomite-based, vertical, and fecal-oral transmission) remains relatively sparse
40 (Cai et al., 2020a, Chen H. et al., 2020, Ghinai et al., 2020, Gu et al., 2020, Li et al., 2020, van
41 Doremalen et al., 2020, Wang W. et al., 2020, Xiao et al., 2020, Yeo et al., 2020). However,
42 recently, evidence supporting the possibility of a fecally-mediated route of transmission has been
43 accumulating (Chen Y. et al., 2020, Gu et al., 2020, He et al., 2020, Wang W. et al., 2020, Xiao
44 et al., 2020, Zhang H. et al., 2020). Specifically, an increasing number of studies have detected
45 the presence of viral RNA in stool from COVID-19 patients, and to date, there are at least three
46 reports of viable virus having been identified in patient stool samples (Wang W. et al., 2020,
47 Xiao et al., 2020, Zhang Yong et al., 2020). Given the quickly evolving situation, it is imperative
48 that the most current information be considered in the ongoing public health response to COVID-
49 19. In this article, recent evidence about the potential for fecal transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is
50 briefly summarized, and the possible implications for transmission mitigation and disease control
51 are discussed from a public health perspective.

52 Prior Knowledge on Related Viruses

53 Coronaviruses are comprised of a family of >30 viruses that exhibit a substantial amount
54 of genetic diversity and have the largest known genomes out of all RNA viruses. Studies
55 conducted prior to the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 have demonstrated that other coronaviruses
56 can be shed in feces (Corman et al., 2014, Dominguez et al., 2007, Drosten et al., 2013, Kim et
57 al., 2016, Xu et al., 2005). For example, the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
58 (MERS-CoV) has been detected in fecal samples from some infected individuals at low viral
59 loads (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Corman et al., 2016, Drosten et al., 2013, Wu
60 et al., 2015), though there have been no confirmed cases of fecal transmission, to our knowledge
61 (Bak et al., 2018). Similarly, after the 2002 SARS epidemic, which was caused by a virus
62 (SARS-CoV) that shares ~80% genetic homology with SARS-CoV-2, fecal shedding was noted
63 in a subset of patients (Cheng et al., 2004, Xu et al., 2005), and SARS-CoV RNA was detected in
64 sewage water from Beijing hospitals that were treating SARS patients, though infectious virions
65 were not identified (Lee, 2003, Wang et al., 2005a, Wang et al., 2005b, Yeo et al., 2020).

66 **Current Knowledge on SARS-CoV-2**

67 To date, a number of studies have utilized reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain
68 reaction (RT-PCR) for the detection of viral RNA in stool samples and anal swabs from patients
69 with COVID-19 (see references in Table 1). With the exception of a report on a familial COVID-
70 19 cluster (Chan et al., 2020), all of these studies have identified RNA from the novel
71 coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, in stool or anal swabs from at least some infected patients (Table 1).
72 Prevalence of positivity from stool specimens has varied widely across studies, but most reports
73 have been based on a small number of patients and the timing of specimen collection has been
74 largely inconsistent and unstandardized. This is unsurprising, as most reports are from case
75 reports or case series of patients treated on the frontlines during the pandemic (as opposed to

76 formally structured research studies). While some of these case series have described the
77 collection of multiple specimens over the course of illness or hospitalization (Chen W. et al.,
78 2020, Ling et al., 2020, The COVID-19 Investigation Team, 2020, Wu et al., 2020, Xiao et al.,
79 2020), it remains challenging to assess exactly when the virus may have started shedding in the
80 stool initially (e.g., during the incubation period, upon onset of illness, and/or during
81 convalescence). Further, it is unclear how long the shedding tends to continue, though a few
82 studies that collected samples serially have observed durations of positivity between 1 to >30
83 days post onset of illness (Ling et al., 2020, The COVID-19 Investigation Team, 2020, Wu et al.,
84 2020, Xiao et al., 2020, Zhang Yong et al., 2020). However, more consistent serial specimen
85 monitoring on a larger number of patients is warranted before clear conclusions about duration of
86 shedding can be drawn.

87 Currently, it remains unclear whether there may be associations between detection in
88 stool and severity of disease or patterns of symptomatology. Observations to date indicate that a
89 subset of COVID-19 patients (2-35%) have experienced some gastrointestinal (GI) symptoms,
90 such as abdominal discomfort, diarrhea, GI bleeding, nausea, and vomiting, though these
91 symptoms are much less prevalent than respiratory involvement (Wang D. et al., 2020, Yeo et
92 al., 2020). Some early reports indicated that mild GI symptoms sometimes precede respiratory
93 signs and fever in about 10% of patients (Gu et al., 2020, Holshue et al., 2020, Wang D. et al.,
94 2020); however, some patients who had later onsets of GI symptoms, did not experience GI
95 symptoms during the course of illness, or had recovered from illness still tested positive for viral
96 RNA in stool (Cai et al., 2020b, Kam et al., 2020, Ling et al., 2020, Wang W. et al., 2020). For
97 example, Ling et al. reported the presence of viral RNA in the stool of 11 convalescing adult
98 patients who were no longer febrile or experiencing respiratory symptoms (Ling et al., 2020).

99 Interestingly, Tang et al. found viral RNA in stool samples of an asymptomatic child, whose
100 parents tested negative for the virus on two separate occasions that were two weeks apart, using
101 sputum, nasopharyngeal, and stool specimens (Tang et al., 2020). In another recent case report, a
102 6-month old asymptomatic infant who had close contact with his infected parents tested negative
103 for viral RNA in stool samples on the second day of hospitalization, while he was both viremic
104 and positive on nasopharyngeal swabs (Kam et al., 2020). However, on the ninth day, a stool
105 specimen tested positive, though the infant was still not experiencing gastrointestinal symptoms.
106 On the seventeenth day, nasopharyngeal swabs became negative, but another stool specimen was
107 not collected.

108 **Potential for Fecal Transmissibility**

109 While current studies imply that SARS-CoV-2 may be shedding through stool in at least
110 a subset of patients, the detection of viral genetic material in stool does not necessarily indicate
111 that viable infectious virions are present in fecal material or that the virus can or has spread
112 through fecal transmission (e.g., fecal-oral, -fomite, or -aerosol/droplet) (de Graaf et al., 2017). A
113 small number of studies have addressed the former directly (Wang W. et al., 2020, Xiao et al.,
114 2020, Zhang Yong et al., 2020). The Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC)
115 isolated viable SARS-CoV-2 from a stool sample of a laboratory-confirmed patient from
116 Heilongjiang Province, China about 15 days after onset of disease (Zhang Yong et al., 2020). In
117 a recent study, Wang et al. cultured 4 patient stool specimens that had high viral RNA copy
118 numbers and was able to use electron microscopy to observe live virus in two of them (Wang W.
119 et al., 2020). Additionally, Xiao et al. briefly mentioned having identified live virions from stool,
120 but details are unavailable, as the data are yet unpublished (Xiao et al., 2020). Because these
121 findings are based on a very small number of patients, additional studies are strongly warranted

122 on how frequently viable virus is present in patient stool, and when present, what the range of
123 viral loads may be, particularly because the ability of the virus to be spread through fecal
124 transmission is largely contingent on these factors. It is presently believed that SARS-CoV-2
125 may have a low infective dose (Lee and Hsueh, 2020), implying that low viral loads in stool
126 could still be a concern for transmissibility.

127 With regard to possible fecal-oral transmission specifically, it is relevant that cells in the
128 oral cavity, esophagus, and other parts of the gastrointestinal tract express angiotensin converting
129 enzyme 2 (ACE2) receptors. ACE2 has been identified as the host receptor that interacts with the
130 viral spike protein to facilitate entry of SARS-CoV-2 into the host cell (Gu et al., 2020, Xu et al.,
131 2020). Xiao et al. reported positive staining for SARS-CoV-2 in GI tissue samples from one
132 patient who underwent endoscopic biopsy on the tenth day of illness (Xiao et al., 2020). The
133 authors also discussed that positive staining was detected in other patients' tissue specimens,
134 though these data were not presented. These findings highlight the urgent need for further
135 research on potential fecal-oral transmission and the possible significance and/or sequelae of
136 viral presence in the GI tract.

137 **Implications for Public Health**

138 Based on current knowledge, additional precautions for preventing potential fecal
139 transmission should be strongly considered until future studies can establish whether this is a
140 plausible (and if so, frequent) mode of transmission for SARS-CoV-2 (He et al., 2020).
141 Considerations regarding sewage exposure, nosocomial infections, residential care facilities, and
142 food preparation are briefly discussed below. If it is confirmed that the virus can be transmitted
143 through fecal contamination, more extensive measures, including a public education campaign,
144 may be necessary to help mitigate the spread of COVID-19.

145 Fecal-oral and waterborne transmission routes could be particularly problematic in areas
146 with inadequate sanitation and limited access to uncontaminated drinking water (de Graaf et al.,
147 2017, World Health Organization, 2019, Yeo et al., 2020). There are presently no relevant data
148 on the load of viable virus that would be necessary for infection through drinking water.
149 Adequate chlorination of water is currently believed to be sufficient treatment for inactivation of
150 the virus (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 2020f). During processing of wastewater,
151 the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends that workers at
152 wastewater treatment plants take standard precautions (i.e., wearing personal protective
153 equipment) to prevent exposure to aerosolized sewage. Although there is no evidence of any
154 SARS-CoV-2 transmission through this mechanism to date, in 2003, SARS transmission in the
155 Amoy Gardens housing complex in Hong Kong was thought to be accelerated through sewage
156 aerosol (Hung, 2003). Exposure to aerosolized sewage was perpetuated by an inadequate
157 bathroom floor drainage system that allowed for the formation of virus-containing droplets,
158 which were likely circulated further by the ventilation system in the room (Bell et al., 2004,
159 Hung, 2003). Incidentally, the Amoy Gardens cluster was impacted disproportionately by
160 gastrointestinal symptoms, compared to other SARS clusters (Lee, 2003, World Health
161 Organization, 2003).

162 If fecal transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 is confirmed, healthcare and laboratory settings
163 present another possible target for preempting further disease spread. According to Yeo et al.,
164 strict preventive measures should be taken when handling stool or fecal samples from SARS-
165 CoV-2 infected patients (Yeo et al., 2020). Standard precautions are already adopted by
166 laboratory personnel who handle fecal specimens (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention,
167 2016, The American Society for Microbiology, 2019, World Health Organization, 2020).

168 Currently, the CDC recommends that virus isolation and cultures be handled in Biosafety Level
169 3 (BSL-3) settings, whereas routine diagnostic testing be conducted in a BSL-2 lab (Centers for
170 Disease Control & Prevention, 2020d). Interim recommendations are also available for
171 preventing nosocomial infection in healthcare settings treating COVID-19 patients, but are
172 largely based on prevention of respiratory droplet and contact transmission, and will likely
173 need to be updated as information evolves on how prevalent fecally-mediated modes of
174 transmission may be for SARS-CoV-2 (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 2020c).

175 Peng et al. have recently described specific recommendations for prevention of COVID-
176 19 spread in dental practices (Peng et al., 2020). They suggest a gamut of preventive strategies
177 in the dental clinic setting, such as patient evaluation (e.g., checking body temperature),
178 utilization of rubber dam isolation to prevent aerosol, and the use of personal protective
179 equipment [PPE] (including masks, goggles, gloves, caps, face shields, etc.) for all healthcare
180 providers (not just dental professionals). Specifically with regard to fecal-oral transmission
181 potential, they emphasize the importance of hand hygiene. Hand-to-mouth contact is common
182 in dental practices, and while gloves can help mitigate risk, PPE can become contaminated if
183 best practices are not followed (for example, when putting on, removing, or changing gloves)
184 (World Health Organization, 2009). Although official guidelines on COVID-19 specific to
185 dental practices are not yet available, the CDC states that recommendations for practitioners are
186 under development (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 2020a). As of 20 March 2020,
187 they are advising the postponement of elective or non-urgent dental procedures to conserve PPE
188 for hospitals.

189 Based on prior literature, possible fecal transmission can also have implications for
190 residential care facilities, such as nursing homes or other institutions in which residents may not
191 be able to maintain meticulous personal hygiene (e.g., due to disability, illness, or cognitive
192 impairment) (Cohen et al., 2017, Montoya and Mody, 2011). Such facilities have already been
193 associated with COVID-19 outbreaks (Fabbre and Mccoppin, 2020, Hendrix, 2020). Besides
194 following the most up-to-date recommendations from relevant public health entities (Centers for
195 Disease Control & Prevention, 2020e), more stringent tactics may be warranted to avoid fecal
196 transmission. For example, restrooms should be sanitized several times throughout the day with
197 disinfectants that are appropriate for use against SARS-CoV-2 (e.g., List N from the U.S.
198 Environmental Protection Agency) (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2020).
199 Personal-sized hand sanitizer can be provided to residents, and they can be instructed on frequent
200 use. Janitorial staff should be made aware of the potential routes of transmission and be trained
201 on best practices for sanitization and personal prevention.

202 In facilities with incontinent residents, such as nursing homes, hospitals, and home
203 healthcare settings, some individuals may require assistance with changing and disposal of
204 absorbent pads, disposable underwear, or diapers. In fact, by some estimates, approximately half
205 of all nursing home residents are affected by some level of urinary or fecal incontinence (Al-
206 Samarraï et al., 2007, Ouslander and Schnelle, 1995). Caring for these patients or residents may
207 pose an additional risk for transmission, and nursing staff responsible for incontinence care
208 should be aware that immediate and appropriate disposal of contaminated materials, proper PPE
209 use, and hand hygiene are of heightened importance. If not already, these processes should be
210 standardized, and ample hand sanitizing stations with automatic dispensers, as well as signage to
211 remind staff to wash their hands, should be installed, if not already in place (Arbogast et al.,

212 2016, Doronina et al., 2017, Kampf et al., 2009). Preventive strategies in such environments
213 should be a high public health priority, given the increased COVID-19 mortality risk among
214 geriatric populations and individuals with existing health conditions (Weiss and Murdoch, 2020).

215 If fecal transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 is shown to be plausible, hygienic food
216 preparation will be another key consideration. Due to other fecally transmissible illnesses (e.g.,
217 salmonellosis, Hepatitis A, etc.), frequent washing of hands, utensils, and materials used in
218 cooking is already strongly advisable and is a standard component of food handler safety
219 training/certification curricula (Cohen et al., 2017). Many places that have enacted social
220 distancing or shelter in place orders to reduce COVID-19 incidence classify restaurants as an
221 essential service and permit them to serve take-out food (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
222 2020). Thus, public health agencies should engage in educational tactics to inform staff who
223 handle food that fecal-oral transmission of COVID-19 may be possible. Screening food handlers
224 for fever or obvious symptoms each day is a proactive step that restaurants and grocery stores
225 can also consider.

226 Clearly, sufficient hand hygiene is a mainstay of prevention against droplet, fomite-
227 based, and fecal-oral spread of disease (Lei et al., 2020). The recent public health messaging and
228 media campaigns about the importance of hand-hygiene related to the pandemic should help
229 reduce transmission regardless of whether or not fecal transmission is possible. However,
230 understanding all key mechanisms of spread can assist public health officials with targeting
231 messaging more effectively or adapting recommendations, as appropriate. For example,
232 recommendations on how long individuals should stay isolated after recovery can be expanded,
233 if future research finds that SARS-CoV-2 tends to persist at infectious doses longer than
234 expected in the stool of cases who are convalescing or have achieved clinical recovery.

235 In addition to appropriate hand hygiene practices, the role of environmental disinfection
236 is crucial for preventing fomite-based transmission. In general, fomites are already a known
237 reservoir for many fecal pathogens (Boone and Gerba, 2007, Julian et al., 2013). The potential
238 for fomites to act as a SARS-CoV-2 reservoir is already of significant concern given that virus-
239 harboring droplets or aerosol can contaminate surfaces (or hands then surfaces through touch)
240 and that the virus can remain viable for several hours on certain types of surfaces (Ong et al.,
241 2020, van Doremalen et al., 2020). If future research establishes that viable virus can be found in
242 stool at potentially relevant doses, this would support the need for further precautions in
243 residences, public restrooms, and numerous other facilities. Use of an effective disinfectant to
244 frequently and thoroughly sanitize surfaces and objects is a mainstay of prevention of fomite-
245 based transmission.

246 Finally, it should be noted that as hospitals reach capacity and extend patient care to
247 overflow facilities, appropriate engineering controls need to be in place, especially in case of a
248 shortage of PPE (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 2020b), and the specific
249 environmental control strategies could vary depending on whether transmission is commonly
250 occurring through multiple routes. For instance, indoor restroom facilities may need to be
251 carefully inspected in any high-capacity facility, such as a dormitory or hotel, to avoid a situation
252 like the Amory Gardens SARS outbreak.

253 Out of an abundance of caution, the public health community should continue to
254 contemplate what additional preventive measures or recommendations, with regard to hygiene,
255 environmental disinfection, engineering controls, and other avenues, may be warranted based on
256 the currently available evidence about potential fecal transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2. While
257 existing measures (e.g., social distancing measures, stay at home orders, hand hygiene education

258 campaigns, etc.) may be helpful in the context of our present understanding of how COVID-19 is
259 transmitted, there are many other public health strategies that can be considered if new evidence
260 consistently supports possible fecal transmissibility.

261 **Conclusions**

262 Our understanding of COVID-19 is advancing rapidly, and future research on all possible
263 modes of transmission are strongly justified given the scale of this pandemic. Current knowledge
264 on whether fecal transmissibility (either orally, through fomites, or by aspiration of fecally-
265 contaminated droplets) is likely to be an important mode of COVID-19 spread is still limited. In
266 particular, evidence about whether infectious virions can be found in stool is based on a small
267 number of patients whose specimens were collected at different times over the course of illness
268 or convalescence. Further research is warranted to elucidate whether SARS-CoV-2 is present in
269 stool at potentially infectious doses, and if so, to assess the duration of viral persistence in fecal
270 matter. These questions are of public health significance and should be examined in larger
271 studies to help inform future disease mitigation guidelines. Efforts to test for the presence of
272 SARS-CoV-2 in sewage are already underway in some cities, and very preliminary evidence
273 suggests that viral RNA may be detectable in sewage samples in certain circumstances
274 (BioBot.io, Medema et al., 2020). Additional research on whether the virus is consistently
275 detectable in other bodily fluids, such as breast milk, sweat, or semen, would also help fill some
276 important gaps in the current literature.

Study*	Date Range of Specimen Collection*	Geographic Location	Definition of Positive Result**	Relevant Specimen Type	Number of Positive Patients [†] $N_{\text{positive}}/N_{\text{Total Tested}} (\%)$	Availability of Test Results on Consecutive Specimens	Gastrointestinal Symptoms [°]	Notes
Wang et al. (Wang W. et al., 2020)	1 January – 17 February	Hubei, Shandong, and Beijing, China	Detection of viral RNA: open reading frame lab (ORF1ab); Ct-value <40 ----- Fecal culture conducted on 4 samples with high copy numbers	Fecal samples	44/153 (29)	Not presented	Culture found viable virions in stool from 2 patients <i>without</i> diarrhea.	It is unclear whether these 4 cultured samples were from unique patients. Viable virions were detected in 2/4 (50%) of samples.
J. Zhang et al. (Zhang J. et al., 2020)	27 January – 9 February	Jinhua, China	Detection of viral RNA; details not specified	Fecal samples	5/14 (36)	Yes, some serial test results on fecal samples were available for 6 patients.	No patients with diarrhea or vomiting noted.	Small number of patients in combination with inconsistency in days of testing precludes formal conclusions.
W. Zhang et al. (Zhang W. et al., 2020)	-	Wuhan, China	Detection of viral RNA: spike gene; Ct-value <40	Anal swabs [‡]	First day of sampling: 4/16 (25); Fifth day of sampling: 6/16 (38)	Yes, 4 patients initially negative for virus from anal swabs (and from oral swabs) on the first day of sampling became positive from anal swabs on the fifth day. The other two patients were positive on the first day on oral swabs, but negative on anal swabs.	-	The report indicates that a larger number of suspected patients were tested but not included in the detailed results because they were negative for viral RNA from all specimens collected (oral/anal swabs, blood, and serum)-thus implying that they were not confirmed COVID-19 patients.
Cai et al. (Cai et al., 2020b)	19 January – 3 February	Shanghai and Qingdao, China	Detection of viral RNA: ORF1ab and	Fecal samples	Day 3-13 after onset of illness: 5/6	Yes, 5 patients whose samples initially tested	No diarrhea noted.	Pediatric patients

			nucleoprotein gene; Ct-value <35		(83); Day 18-30 after onset of illness: 5/5 (100)	positive were retested and remained positive on follow-up test (Day 18-30).		
Xiao et al. (Xiao et al., 2020)	1 February-14 February	Zhuhai, China	Detection of viral RNA: ORF1ab and nucleoprotein gene; Ct-value <37 ----- Viral nucleocapsid straining in biopsy tissue collected through endoscopy	Fecal samples ----- Biopsy tissue from esophagus, stomach, duodenum, and rectum available on one patient	39/73 (53)	Yes, 17 (23%) remained positive on fecal samples after becoming respiratory-sample negative. Duration of positivity in fecal samples reported as 1-12 days, with 17 patients still positive when manuscript was written.	A subset of patients (approx. 40%) who tested positive for viral RNA in fecal samples had diarrhea. A very small number also exhibited GI bleeding.	Tissue samples from the esophagus, stomach, duodenum, and rectum were collected on Day 10 of illness from one patient. All stained positive for viral nucleocapsid. Data on this patient also indicated that 3 fecal samples collected between Day 3-7 were negative; 11 samples taken between Day 9-26 were positive.
Tang et al. (Tang et al., 2020)	1 February-14 February	Zhoushan, China	Detection of viral RNA: ORF1ab and nucleoprotein gene; reported Ct-values for results considered positive are all <40, but threshold is not directly specified	Fecal samples	1/3 (33)	Yes, 8 samples were obtained from the positive case in 2 weeks. The last two samples (from 13 th and 14 th of February) were negative. All prior samples were positive.	Case was asymptomatic.	This study was a case report of one family (parents and 10-year old male child) who were exposed to COVID-19 cases, but were asymptomatic. The parents tested negative on multiple specimen types and cannot be considered cases. The positive fecal sample was from the asymptomatic child.
Young et al. (Young et al., 2020)	23 January-25 February	Singapore	Detection of viral RNA: ORF1ab, spike,	Fecal samples	4/8 (50)	Yes, on 6 total patients (3 were negative on all	Authors reported that a subset (n=5) of patients were	

			and nucleoprotein gene; Ct-value <40			collected samples).	treated with antivirals, and of those, 4 developed GI symptoms. (Treatment is likely a confounding factor.)	
COVID-19 Investigation Team [‡] (The COVID-19 Investigation Team, 2020)	20 January – 5 February	AZ, CA, IL, MA, WA, and WI, United States	Detection of viral RNA; details not specified (appendix of laboratory methods is currently unavailable)	Fecal samples	7/10 (70)	Yes, collected every 2-3 days, when possible, for first 17 days of illness. 3 samples remained positive after patients' symptoms were resolved. Duration of positivity reported to be ~2-3 weeks (max: 25 days) post onset of illness.	All 3 patients with diarrhea were positive for viral RNA in stool. Transient GI symptoms were also noted in patients treated with antiviral.	Describes the first 12 cases in the U.S. Some correlation between stool and respiratory positivity reported. <i>Report has not been peer-reviewed (preprint only).</i>
Ling et al. (Ling et al., 2020)	20 January-10 February	Shanghai, China	Lab test data was abstracted from medical records to determine whether samples were positive for viral RNA through RT-PCR	Fecal samples	54/66 (82)	Yes, 11 (17%) still positive upon last observation. Median duration of positivity was 11 days (range: 9-16) post admission for 55 patients who cleared the virus. 43 of 55 patients (78%) had viral presence in stool longer than in throat swabs (about 2-day lag with range of 1-4 days).	-	CD4 + T cell counts were correlated with duration of positivity in stool.
Chen et al. (Chen W. et al., 2020)	January-February	Guangzhou, China	Detection of viral RNA: ORF1ab and	Anal swabs [¥]	11/28 (39)	Data from 1 patient with a repeat swab is	-	Higher proportion of patients with positive anal swabs

			nucleoprotein gene; Ct-value not specified. (Authors state that positives were defined as one or both primer/probe sets providing a “reliable signal.”)			presented.		had severe disease, but this was based on small numbers.
Chan et al. (Chan et al., 2020)	January	Guangdong, China	Detection of viral RNA: RdRp (RNA-dependent RNA polymerase) and spike genes; Ct-value not directly specified	Fecal samples	0/7 (0)	No	Two patients with diarrhea were negative for viral RNA in stool, but authors point out that timing of fecal specimen collection was after diarrhea had subsided.	Family cluster
Kam et al. (Kam et al., 2020)	4 February-20 February	Kallang, Singapore	Detection of viral RNA: ORF1ab and nucleoprotein gene; all Ct-values reported as positive <40, but threshold is not directly specified	Fecal samples	1/1	Yes, negative on Day 2 of hospitalization, positive on Day 9.	No GI symptoms. Patient was virtually asymptomatic.	6 month old infant was asymptomatic, with the exception of being febrile for ~1 hour on Day 2 while viremic. On Day 17, nasopharyngeal swabs became negative, but another stool specimen was not collected.
Y. Zhang et al. (Zhang Yong et al., 2020)	1 February	Heilongjiang, China	Culture through inoculation of stool suspension into cells, followed by	Fecal sample	1/1 (The report implies that specimens from other confirmed	No	-	Duration between onset of illness and collection of the sample from which the virus was

			virus detection through electron microscopy		patients were processed, but virus was not detected from those specimens. However, the total number of specimens is not provided.)			isolated was 15 days. Virus was also sequenced and found to have high genetic identity with the first isolated virus from Wuhan.
Wu et al. (Wu et al., 2020)	16 January-15 March	Zhuhai, China	Detection of viral RNA: RdRP, nucleoprotein, and membrane genes; Ct-value not directly specified	Fecal samples	41/74 (55)	Yes, samples were collected every 1-2 days (as available) until 2 sequential negative results were observed. Among the 41 initially positive patients, fecal samples remained positive for an average of 27.9 days (standard deviation: 10.7) after onset of first symptom. One patient tested positive 47 days after onset.	Authors stated that the presence of GI symptoms was not associated with viral RNA presence in fecal samples.	It is notable that first symptom onset dates were used to calculate duration (rather than date of hospitalization, for example). Duration of positivity did not differ significantly by disease severity. On average, fecal samples remained positive for approximately 11 days longer than respiratory samples.

Note. It is possible that some patients may be overlapping between studies. This cannot always be clarified based on publically available data.

* Year is 2020 for study publication and specimen collection dates.

** Ct=Cycle threshold for reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). RT-PCR is the standard method used to detect viral RNA. Lower values correlate with higher viral copy numbers.

† Unit of observation is the patient (not stool samples) in prevalence of positive results.

‡ Includes one case that is also reported on by Holshue et al., which has, therefore, been excluded from the table (Holshue et al., 2020).

¥ Anal swabs may not be as directly relevant to the topic under review as stool specimens for several reasons (e.g., differences in cell content), but are presented to provide a more comprehensive perspective.

° Pertinent information provided as reported, *if* any were specifically noted to be among patients tested for viral markers using relevant specimens (e.g., stool or anal swabs). Note that not all studies provide enough details to definitively assess whether patients with GI symptoms were the same as those who tested positive/negative for viral markers in relevant specimens. Symptoms considered gastrointestinal (GI) include diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, GI discomfort, or GI bleeding.

Journal Pre-proof

Conflicts of Interest: The author has no conflicts of interest to report.

Funding Source: None.

Ethical Approval: This paper is a review of available literature; therefore, ethical approval was not required.

Acknowledgements: The author acknowledges Megan Rafferty for her technical assistance.

Journal Pre-proof

References

- Al-Samarrai NR, Uman GC, Al-Samarrai T, Alessi CA. Introducing a new incontinence management system for nursing home residents. *J Am Med Dir Assoc* 2007;8(4):253-61.
- Arbogast JW, Moore-Schiltz L, Jarvis WR, Harpster-Hagen A, Hughes J, Parker A. Impact of a Comprehensive Workplace Hand Hygiene Program on Employer Health Care Insurance Claims and Costs, Absenteeism, and Employee Perceptions and Practices. *J Occup Environ Med* 2016;58(6):e231-40.
- Bak SL, Jun KI, Jung J, Kim JH, Kang CK, Park WB, et al. An Atypical Case of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome in a Returning Traveler to Korea from Kuwait, 2018. *J Korean Med Sci* 2018;33(53):e348.
- Bell DM, World Health Organization Working Group on I, Community Transmission of S. Public health interventions and SARS spread, 2003. *Emerg Infect Dis* 2004;10(11):1900-6.
- BioBot.io. COVID-19 testing in city sewage; Available from: <https://www.biobot.io/covid19/>. [Accessed March 23 2020].
- Boone SA, Gerba CP. Significance of fomites in the spread of respiratory and enteric viral disease. *Appl Environ Microbiol* 2007;73(6):1687-96.
- Cai J, Sun W, Huang J, Gamber M, Wu J, He G. Indirect Virus Transmission in Cluster of COVID-19 Cases, Wenzhou, China, 2020. *Emerg Infect Dis* 2020a;26(6).
- Cai J, Xu J, Lin D, Yang Z, Xu L, Qu Z, et al. A Case Series of children with 2019 novel coronavirus infection: clinical and epidemiological features. *Clin Infect Dis* 2020b.
- Centers for Disease Control & Prevention. MERS Clinical Features; Available from: <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/mers/clinical-features.html>. [Accessed March 24 2020].
- Centers for Disease Control & Prevention. DPDx: Stool Specimens - Safety; 2016. Available from: <https://www.cdc.gov/dpdx/diagnosticprocedures/stool/safety.html>. [Accessed March 19 2020].

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention. CDC Recommendation: Postpone Non-Urgent Dental Procedures, Surgeries, and Visits; 2020a. Available from:

<https://www.cdc.gov/oralhealth/infectioncontrol/statement-COVID.html>. [Accessed March 23 2020].

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention. Checklist for Healthcare Facilities: Strategies for Optimizing the Supply of N95 Respirators during the COVID-19 Response; 2020b. Available from:

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/checklist-n95-strategy.html>. [Accessed March 24 2020].

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention. Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings; 2020c. Available from: <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/infection-control/control-recommendations.html>.

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention. Interim Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines for Handling and Processing Specimens Associated with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19); 2020d. Available from: <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/lab/lab-biosafety-guidelines.html>. [Accessed March 21 2020].

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention. Preparing for COVID-19: Long-term Care Facilities, Nursing Homes; 2020e. Available from: <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/healthcare-facilities/prevent-spread-in-long-term-care-facilities.html>. [Accessed March 20 2020].

Centers for Disease Control & Prevention. Water Transmission and COVID-19; 2020f. Available from: <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/water.html>. [Accessed March 20 2020].

Chan JF, Yuan S, Kok KH, To KK, Chu H, Yang J, et al. A familial cluster of pneumonia associated with the 2019 novel coronavirus indicating person-to-person transmission: a study of a family cluster. *Lancet* 2020;395(10223):514-23.

Chen H, Guo J, Wang C, Luo F, Yu X, Zhang W, et al. Clinical characteristics and intrauterine vertical transmission potential of COVID-19 infection in nine pregnant women: a retrospective review of medical records. *Lancet* 2020;395(10226):809-15.

Chen W, Lan Y, Yuan X, Deng X, Li Y, Cai X, et al. Detectable 2019-nCoV viral RNA in blood is a strong indicator for the further clinical severity. *Emerg Microbes Infect* 2020;9(1):469-73.

Chen Y, Guo Y, Pan Y, Zhao ZJ. Structure analysis of the receptor binding of 2019-nCoV. *Biochem Biophys Res Commun* 2020.

Cheng PK, Wong DA, Tong LK, Ip SM, Lo AC, Lau CS, et al. Viral shedding patterns of coronavirus in patients with probable severe acute respiratory syndrome. *Lancet* 2004;363(9422):1699-700.

Cohen J, Powderly WG, Opal SM. *Infectious Diseases*. 4th ed: Elsevier, 2017.

Corman VM, Albarrak AM, Omrani AS, Albarrak MM, Farah ME, Almasri M, et al. Viral Shedding and Antibody Response in 37 Patients With Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Infection. *Clin Infect Dis* 2016;62(4):477-83.

Corman VM, Kallies R, Philipps H, Gopner G, Muller MA, Eckerle I, et al. Characterization of a novel betacoronavirus related to middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in European hedgehogs. *J Virol* 2014;88(1):717-24.

de Graaf M, Beck R, Caccio SM, Duim B, Fraaij P, Le Guyader FS, et al. Sustained fecal-oral human-to-human transmission following a zoonotic event. *Curr Opin Virol* 2017;22:1-6.

Dominguez SR, O'Shea TJ, Oko LM, Holmes KV. Detection of group 1 coronaviruses in bats in North America. *Emerg Infect Dis* 2007;13(9):1295-300.

Doronina O, Jones D, Martello M, Biron A, Lavoie-Tremblay M. A Systematic Review on the Effectiveness of Interventions to Improve Hand Hygiene Compliance of Nurses in the Hospital Setting. *J Nurs Scholarsh* 2017;49(2):143-52.

Drosten C, Seilmaier M, Corman VM, Hartmann W, Scheible G, Sack S, et al. Clinical features and virological analysis of a case of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus infection. *Lancet Infect Dis* 2013;13(9):745-51.

Fabbre A, Mccoppin R. 24 new cases of coronavirus at Willowbrook nursing home brings total to 46, officials say. One resident's daughter visits her mom through window. *Chicago Tribune* 2020.

Ghinai I, McPherson TD, Hunter JC, Kirking HL, Christiansen D, Joshi K, et al. First known person-to-person transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in the USA.

Lancet 2020.

Gu J, Han B, Wang J. COVID-19: Gastrointestinal manifestations and potential fecal-oral transmission.

Gastroenterology 2020.

He Y, Wang Z, Li F, Shi Y. Public health might be endangered by possible prolonged discharge of

SARS-CoV-2 in stool. J Infect 2020.

Hendrix M. How a Washington State Nursing Home Became the Center of the COVID-19 Pandemic;

2020. Available from: <https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/03/coronavirus-outbreak-how-it-spread-nationwide-from-washington-state-nursing-home/>. [Accessed March 24 2020].

Holshue ML, DeBolt C, Lindquist S, Lofy KH, Wiesman J, Bruce H, et al. First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the United States. N Engl J Med 2020;382(10):929-36.

Hung LS. The SARS epidemic in Hong Kong: what lessons have we learned? J R Soc Med

2003;96(8):374-8.

Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering. Coronavirus COVID-19 Global

Cases; 2020. Available from: <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html>. [Accessed March 24 2020].

Julian TR, MacDonald LH, Guo Y, Marks SJ, Kosek M, Yori PP, et al. Fecal indicator bacteria contamination of fomites and household demand for surface disinfection products: a case study from Peru. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2013;89(5):869-72.

Kam KQ, Yung CF, Cui L, Lin Tzer Pin R, Mak TM, Maiwald M, et al. A Well Infant with Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) with High Viral Load. Clin Infect Dis 2020.

Kampf G, Löffler H, Gastmeier P. Hand hygiene for the prevention of nosocomial infections. Dtsch Arztebl Int 2009;106(40):649-55.

Kim HK, Yoon SW, Kim DJ, Koo BS, Noh JY, Kim JH, et al. Detection of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-Like, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome-Like Bat Coronaviruses and Group H Rotavirus in Faeces of Korean Bats. Transbound Emerg Dis 2016;63(4):365-72.

- Lee PI, Hsueh PR. Emerging threats from zoonotic coronaviruses—from SARS and MERS to 2019-nCoV. *J Microbiol Immunol Infect* 2020.
- Lee SH. The SARS epidemic in Hong Kong. *J Epidemiol Community Health* 2003;57(9):652-4.
- Lei H, Xiao S, Cowling BJ, Li Y. Hand hygiene and surface cleaning should be paired for prevention of fomite transmission. *Indoor Air* 2020;30(1):49-59.
- Li Y, Zhao R, Zheng S, Chen X, Wang J, Sheng X, et al. Lack of Vertical Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2, China. *Emerg Infect Dis* 2020;26(6).
- Ling Y, Xu SB, Lin YX, Tian D, Zhu ZQ, Dai FH, et al. Persistence and clearance of viral RNA in 2019 novel coronavirus disease rehabilitation patients. *Chin Med J (Engl)* 2020.
- Medema G, Heijnen L, Elsinga G, Italiaander R, Brouwer A. Presence of SARS-Coronavirus-2 in sewage. Preprint 2020.
- Montoya A, Mody L. Common infections in nursing homes: a review of current issues and challenges. *Aging health* 2011;7(6):889-99.
- Ong SWX, Tan YK, Chia PY, Lee TH, Ng OT, Wong MSY, et al. Air, Surface Environmental, and Personal Protective Equipment Contamination by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) From a Symptomatic Patient. *JAMA* 2020.
- Ouslander JG, Schnelle JF. Incontinence in the nursing home. *Ann Intern Med* 1995;122(6):438-49.
- Peng X, Xu X, Li Y, Cheng L, Zhou X, Ren B. Transmission routes of 2019-nCoV and controls in dental practice. *Int J Oral Sci* 2020;12(1):9.
- Shanmugaraj B, Malla A, Phoolcharoen W. Emergence of Novel Coronavirus 2019-nCoV: Need for Rapid Vaccine and Biologics Development. *Pathogens* 2020;9(2).
- Tang A, Tong ZD, Wang HL, Dai YX, Li KF, Liu JN, et al. Detection of Novel Coronavirus by RT-PCR in Stool Specimen from Asymptomatic Child, China. *Emerg Infect Dis* 2020;26(6).
- The American Society for Microbiology. Interim Clinical Laboratory Guideline for Biological Safety; 2019. Available from: <https://www.asm.org/ASM/media/Policy-and-Advocacy/Biosafety-white-paper-2019.pdf>.

The COVID-19 Investigation Team. First 12 patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the United States. Preprint 2020.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Guidance on the essential critical infrastructure workforce; 2020. Available from: <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/guidance-essential-critical-infrastructure-workforce>. [Accessed March 23 2020].

United States Environmental Protection Agency. List N: Disinfectants for Use Against SARS-CoV-2; 2020. Available from: <https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/list-n-disinfectants-use-against-sars-cov-2>. [Accessed March 18 2020].

van Doremalen N, Bushmaker T, Morris DH, Holbrook MG, Gamble A, Williamson BN, et al. Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1. *N Engl J Med* 2020.

Wang D, Hu B, Hu C, Zhu F, Liu X, Zhang J, et al. Clinical Characteristics of 138 Hospitalized Patients With 2019 Novel Coronavirus-Infected Pneumonia in Wuhan, China. *JAMA* 2020.

Wang W, Xu Y, Gao R, Lu R, Han K, Wu G, et al. Detection of SARS-CoV-2 in Different Types of Clinical Specimens. *JAMA* 2020.

Wang XW, Li J, Guo T, Zhen B, Kong Q, Yi B, et al. Concentration and detection of SARS coronavirus in sewage from Xiao Tang Shan Hospital and the 309th Hospital of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. *Water Sci Technol* 2005a;52(8):213-21.

Wang XW, Li JS, Guo TK, Zhen B, Kong QX, Yi B, et al. Concentration and detection of SARS coronavirus in sewage from Xiao Tang Shan Hospital and the 309th Hospital. *J Virol Methods* 2005b;128(1-2):156-61.

Weiss P, Murdoch DR. Clinical course and mortality risk of severe COVID-19. *Lancet* 2020.

World Health Organization. Update 95 - SARS: Chronology of a serial killer; 2003. Available from: https://www.who.int/csr/don/2003_07_04/en/. [Accessed March 19 2020].

World Health Organization. Glove Use Information Leaflet; 2009. Available from: https://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/Glove_Use_Information_Leaflet.pdf. [Accessed March 18 2020].

World Health Organization. Sanitation Fact Sheet; 2019. Available from: <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/sanitation>. [Accessed March 20 2020].

World Health Organization. Laboratory biosafety guidance related to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19); 2020. Available from: [https://www.who.int/publications-detail/laboratory-biosafety-guidance-related-to-coronavirus-disease-2019-\(covid-19\)](https://www.who.int/publications-detail/laboratory-biosafety-guidance-related-to-coronavirus-disease-2019-(covid-19)). [Accessed March 23 2020].

Wu J, Yi L, Zou L, Zhong H, Liang L, Song T, et al. Imported case of MERS-CoV infection identified in China, May 2015: detection and lesson learned. *Euro Surveill* 2015;20(24).

Wu Y, Guo C, Tang L, Hong Z, Zhou J, Dong X, et al. Prolonged presence of SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA in faecal samples. *Lancet Gastroenterol Hepatol* 2020.

Xiao F, Tang M, Zheng X, Liu Y, Li X, Shan H. Evidence for gastrointestinal infection of SARS-CoV-2. *Gastroenterology* 2020.

Xu D, Zhang Z, Jin L, Chu F, Mao Y, Wang H, et al. Persistent shedding of viable SARS-CoV in urine and stool of SARS patients during the convalescent phase. *Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis* 2005;24(3):165-71.

Xu H, Zhong L, Deng J, Peng J, Dan H, Zeng X, et al. High expression of ACE2 receptor of 2019-nCoV on the epithelial cells of oral mucosa. *Int J Oral Sci* 2020;12(1):8.

Yeo C, Kaushal S, Yeo D. Enteric involvement of coronaviruses: is faecal-oral transmission of SARS-CoV-2 possible? *Lancet Gastroenterol Hepatol* 2020;5(4):335-7.

Young BE, Ong SWX, Kalimuddin S, Low JG, Tan SY, Loh J, et al. Epidemiologic Features and Clinical Course of Patients Infected With SARS-CoV-2 in Singapore. *JAMA* 2020.

Zhang H, Kang Z, Gong H, Xu D, Wang J, Li Z, et al. The digestive system is a potential route of 2019-nCoV infection: a bioinformatics analysis based on single-cell transcriptomes. 2020.

Zhang J, Wang S, Xue Y. Fecal specimen diagnosis 2019 novel coronavirus-infected pneumonia. *J Med Virol* 2020.

Zhang W, Du RH, Li B, Zheng XS, Yang XL, Hu B, et al. Molecular and serological investigation of 2019-nCoV infected patients: implication of multiple shedding routes. *Emerg Microbes Infect* 2020;9(1):386-9.

Zhang Y, Chen C, Zhu S, Shu C, Wang D, Song J. Isolation of 2019-nCoV from a Stool Specimen of a Laboratory-Confirmed Case of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). *China CDC Weekly* 2020;2(8):123-4.

Declarations of Interest: The author has no conflicts of interest to report.

Highlights

- Evidence supporting the possibility of a fecally-mediated route of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been accumulating.
- Several descriptive case series have reported the presence of viral genetic material in the stool of some COVID-19 patients.
- If the possibility of fecal transmission (e.g., fecal-oral, -fomite, or -aerosol/droplet) is established, it will impact public health messaging and recommendations, including guidelines on sewage exposure, nosocomial infections, residential care facilities, and food preparation.